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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
DEBRA D. ZUVER and DOWNY ZUVER
a minor, by and through her
general guardian, Milton T.
Zuver and MILTON T. ZUVER,
individually,

]
]
]
]i
]

Plaintiffs/Appellants,

]i

vs.

]

MOLERWAY FREIGHT LINES, INC.,
a Montana corporation, TED
PROKUPIS and JEFF STEEGER,
Defendants/Appellees.

Case No. 930117
Priority No. 15

]
]
]

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1992).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 32A-14-101 (1991) provides in pertinent part:
(1) Any person who directly gives, sells, or otherwise
provides liquor, leave at a location allowing consumption
on thee premises, any alcoholic beverage, to the
following persons, and by those actions causes the
intoxication of that person, is liable for injuries in
person, property, or means of support to any third
person, or to the spouse, child, or parent of that third
person, resulting from the intoxication:
(a) any person under the age of 21 years;
(b) any person who is apparently under the
influence of intoxicating alcoholic beverages
or products or drugs;
(c) any person whom the person furnishing the
alcoholic beverage knew or should have known
from the circumstances was under the influence
of
intoxicating
alcoholic
beverages
or
products or drugs; or
(d) any person who is a known interdicted person.
(2)

An

employer

is liable

for the

actions

of !+-<=

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In addition to the

facts set

forth by

Plaintiffs, the

following undisputed facts are determinative of this appeal:
1.

A group of people, some of whom worked in the Molerway

Salt Lake terminal and some who did not work for Molerway at all,
decided to get together on a social basis.1 This group of people
agreed to get together for this social outing on the weekend of
August 17 and 18, 1991, which was a Saturday and Sunday.2
2. The participants in the activity understood that it was not
connected in any way with their employment with Molerway. Marci
Mannion, who attended the outing, has testified:
14o This social outing was not in any way connected
with my employment with Molerway. My attendance was
purely voluntary. It was simply an outing organized by
people who happened to be working for Molerway.
R.103. (Affidavit of Marci Mannion, f 14). Eight other employees

1

See R.89. affidavit of Jeff Steeger, f 5; R.94.
affidavit of Ted Prokopis, f 5; R.98. affidavit of Marci Mannion,
f 5; R.102. affidavit of Tony R. Pomikala, f 5; R.106. affidavit of
John Edwards, $ 5; R.110. affidavit of Stephanie Bruns, f 5; R.114.
affidavit of Nick Lopez, J 5; R.118. affidavit of Ira Owen, f 5;
and R.122. affidavit of Fred Mower, J 5.
2

See R.89. affidavit of Jeff Steeger, f 6; R.94. affidavit
of Ted Prokopis, f 6; R.98. affidavit of Marci Mannion, f 6; R.102.
affidavit of Tony R. Pomikala, f 6; R.106. affidavit of John
Edwards, 5 6; R.110. affidavit of Stephanie Bruns, f 6; R.114.
affidavit of Nick Lopez, f 6; R.118. affidavit of Ira Owen, 5 6;
R.122. affidavit of Fred Mower, 5 6; and R.125. Zuver deposition,
p. 13.
2

attending the outing have testified likewise.3
3.

None of the employees were paid for their attendance at

the party and the attendance of each was voluntary. Debra Zuver,
the Plaintiff, has testified:
Q. Then I presume that you were not being paid to attend
this outing. Is that correct, not being paid by Molerway?
A. No, sir.
Q. No, you were not being paid?
A. I was not being paid to attend the party.
Q. Was your attendance at this party voluntary?
A. Yes, it was.
R.127. (Deposition of Debra Zuver, p. 34). John Edwards, another
employee of Molerway that attended the party, has testified:
This social outing was not in any way connected with my
employment at Molerway. My attendance was purely
voluntary. It was simply an outing organized by people
who happened to be working for Molerway.
R.107. (Affidavit of John Edwards, f 15 emphasis added). Others who
attended the party have testified likewise.4
3

See R.90. affidavit of Jeff Steeger, 5 15, 16; R.95.
affidavit of Ted Prokopis, f 14, 15, 16; R.99. affidavit of Marci
Mannion, f 13, 14, 15; R.103. affidavit of Tony R. Pomikala, 5 14,
15, 16; R.107. affidavit of John Edwards, f 14, 15, 16; R110.
affidavit of Stephanie Bruns, f 14, 15, 16; R.lll. affidavit of
Nick Lopez, f 14, 16; R.119. affidavit of Ira Owen, f 14, 15, 16;
R.123. affidavit of Fred Mower, f 15, 16, 17.
4

See R.90. affidavit of Jeff Steeger, 5 16; R.95. affidavit
of Ted Prokopis, f 15; R.99. affidavit of Marci Mannion, 5 14;
R.103. affidavit of Tony R. Pomikala, f 15; R.lll. affidavit of
3

4.

None of the guests who attended the party, including

Debra Zuver, were reimbursed for any provisions which they brought
for the party or for gas or other vehicle expenses. The Plaintiff,
Debra Zuver, has testified:
Q. Did you bring food?
A. Yes, I did.
***

Q. Who paid for that?
A. I did.
***

Q. Did you bring alcoholic beverages to the outing?
A. Yes, sir. I did.
Q. Who paid for those?
A. I did.
Q. Did you ever get reimbursed by Molerway for anything
that you had brought?
A. No, sir.
Q. Do you have any personal knowledge that Molerway
reimbursed anybody for anything that was brought to that
party?
A. I believe it was done in a situation where no one
expected to be paid back for bringing potluck items.
R.128-129.
another

(Deposition of Debra Zuver, pp. 28-29). Ir

employee

of

Molerway

that

attended

the

part}

Owen,
has;

testified:

Stephanie Bruns, 5 15; R.115. affidavit of Nick Lopez, f 15; R.119.
affidavit of Ira Owen, f 15; R.123. affidavit of Fred Mower, f 16.
4

11. I was not reimbursed by Molerway for the
beverages or provisions I personally brought to the
outing. All funds expended by me came out of my own
pocket and were not reimbursed by Molerway.
R.119. (Affidavit of Ira Owen, f 11). Eight other employees have
testified that they too were not reimbursed for items brought to
the party. 5
5.

Molerway did not contribute towards the purchase of any

drink —

alcoholic or otherwise and any alcohol consumed at the

outing was brought by the individuals who attended. The President
of Molerway, Trygve Moler, has testified that "[ajbsolutely no
funds

or provisions

(including

alcohol)

were

contributed

or

provided by Molerway towards this social outing." R.85. Affidavit
of Trygve Moler, f 9,6

Similarly, Stephanie Bruns, an employee of

Molerway who attended the party, has testified:
9. This social outing was on a "bring your own food
5

See R.85. affidavit of Trygve Moler, f 9; R.89-90. affidavit
of Jeff Steeger, f 9, 10, 11; R.94-95. affidavit of Ted Prokopis,
f 9, 10, 11; R.98-99. affidavit of Marci Mannion, f 9, 10, 11;
R.102-103. affidavit of Tony R. Pomikala, 5 9, 10, 11; R.106-107.
affidavit of John Edwards, f 9, 10, 11; R. 110-111. affidavit of
Stephanie Bruns, f 9, 10, 11; R.114-115. affidavit of Nick Lopez,
f 9, 10, 11; R.122-123. affidavit of Fred Mower, f 9, 10, 11.
6

See also R.89-90. affidavit of Jeff Steeger, f 9, 10, 11;
R.94-95. affidavit of Ted Prokopis, f 9, 10, 11; R.98-99. affidavit
of Marci Mannion, f 9, 10, 11; R. 102-103. affidavit of Tony R.
Pomikala, J 9, 10, 11; R. 106-107. affidavit of John Edwards, f 9,
10, 11; R. 110-111. affidavit of Stephanie Bruns, fl 9, 10, 11;
R.114-115. affidavit of Nick Lopez, f 9, 10, 11; R.118-119.
affidavit of Ira Owen, f 9, 10, 11; R.122-123, affidavit of Fred
Mower, 5 9, 10, 11; and R.129. Zuver deposition, p. 29.
5

and drink" basis. Molerway did not contribute towards the
purchase of any drink—alcoholic or otherwise, nor did
Molerway contribute towards the purchase of any other
item. Molerway did not provide any funds at all. It was
not an event sponsored or promoted by Molerway.
R.110. (Affidavit of Stephanie Bruns, f 9 ) .
6.

Because all attendees voluntarily attended this outing in

their individual capacity, no one was expected to adhere to any of
Molerway's rules, regulations, or policies and no specific person
was in charge or responsible for anyone's actions while attending
this outing.7 Nick Lopez has testified that:
16. Because the social outing was an event entirely
separate and apart from my employment with Molerway and
was not sponsored nor promoted by Molerway, there was no
specific person in charge, therefore, no one was expected
to adhere to any of Molerway's rules, regulations or
policies. Jeff Steeger was not in charge; everyone could
do what they wanted and come and go as they pleased.
R.115-116. (Affidavit of Nick Lopez, f 16)
7.

Jeff Steeger and Ted Prokupis had absolutely no authority

to act on behalf of Molerway in connection with this activity.
Trygve Moler, the President of Molerway, has testified that "Jeff
Steeger had absolutely no authority whatsoever to act on behalf of
Molerway in any manner in connection with this activity." R.85.
7

See also R. 90-91. affidavit of Jeff Steeger, f 18; R.95,
affidavit of Ted Prokopis, f 16; R.99-100. affidavit of Marci
Mannion, f 15; R. 103-109. affidavit of Tony R. Pomikala, f 16;
R.107. affidavit of John Edwards, f 16; R.lll. affidavit of
Stephanie Bruns, f 16; R.115-116. affidavit of Nick Lopez, f 16;
R.120. affidavit of Ira Owen, f 16; R.124. affidavit of Fred Mower,
1 17.
6

(Affidavit of Trygve Moler, f 7). Jeff Steeger has also testified
that he "had absolutely no authority whatsoever to act on behalf of
Molerway in any manner in connection with this activity.11 R.90.
(Affidavit of Jeff Steeger, f 17) . Ted Prokupis testified likewise.
R.95. (Affidavit of Ted Prokupis, f 17).
8.

Molerway has never provided or contributed funds or

provisions, nor sponsored or promoted social outings or any other
activities for their employees at the Salt Lake City terminal in
the

past

nor

did

they

provide

or

contribute

any

funds or

provisions, nor sponsor or promote this outing at Yuba Reservoir.8
Jeff Steeger testified that:
Molerway has never provided or contributed funds or
provisions, nor sponsored or promoted social outings or
any other activities, including Christmas parties, for
their employees at the Salt Lake City terminal in the
past nor did they provide or contribute funds or
provisions, nor sponsor or promote this outing at Yuba
Reservoir.
R.91. (Affidavit of Jeff Steeger, f 19)
9.

Jeff Steeger inquired of his superiors at Molerway as to

whether he could use a Molerway truck to transport picnic tables,

3

See R.86. affidavit of Trygve Moler, f 10, 11; R.95-96.
affidavit of Ted Prokopis, f 18; R.100. affidavit of Marci Mannion,
1 16; R.104. affidavit of Tony R. Pomikala, f 17; R.107-108.
affidavit of John Edwards, f 17; R.111-112. affidavit of Stephanie
Bruns, f 17; R.116. affidavit of Nick Lopez, 5 17; R.120. affidavit
of Ira Owen, f 17; R.124. affidavit of Fred Mower, f 18.
7

barbecuesf

and

firewood

to the picnic

site.

Permission was

granted.10
10.

The predominant purpose of the party was to serve the

social aspect of the guests. R.167-186. (Plaintiff's Memorandum in
Opposition to Molerway's First Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 28, 10, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I. Molerway cannot be held liable for the alleged sexual
assault committed by Ted Prokupis. The Utah Supreme Court has held
that "as a matter of law the sexual misconduct of an employee is
outside the scope of employment." Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771
P. 2d 1053 (Utah 1989). Thus, under no circumstances can Molerway be
held liable for Mr. Prokupis' alleged sexual assault.
11. Jeff Steeger was properly granted summary judgment. The
Plaintiffs had to present some evidence which indicated that Mr.
Steeger believed there was a "substantial certainty that harm will
result" from his alleged failure to assist the Plaintiffs. Mathesor
v. Pearson, 619 P.2d 321, 322 (Utah 1980). Mr. Steeger's affidavit
indicates that he believed that any relationship betwe n Ted
Prokupis and Debra Zuver was consensual and in fact initiat \ by

9

See R. 85, affidavit of Trygve Moler, f 6; R. 90, affidavit
of Jeff Steeger, f 12.
10

Id.
8

Debra Zuver. Mr. Steeger observed Mr. Prokupis and Ms. Zuver
several times during the night and found both were clothed and
essentially

nothing was going on. R.264.

(Affidavit of Jeff

Steeger, J 1-18)
Plaintiff contends that the jury could find that Mr. Steeger
was not credible in making these statements. However, the Utah
Supreme Court has held that the "trial court cannot consider the
weight of testimony or the credibility of witnesses in considering
a motion for summary judgment." Sandberg v. Klein, 576 P.2d 1291,
1292 (Utah 1978). Since the Plaintiffs presented no evidence that
Jeff

Steeger believed

anything

other than that to which he

testified in his affidavit, summary judgment was properly granted
to Steeger. Thus, there was no liability to be imputed to Molerway
and summary judgment for Molerway was also properly granted.
III. Plaintiffs argued that Steeger witnessed the accident yet
failed to protect the Plaintiffs. They argue that this constitutes
negligent supervision for which Molerway can be held liable.
However, the evidence conclusively demonstrates that Jeff Steeger
was acting in his individual capacity at the party and therefore,
had no duty to protect Plaintiffs.
IV. Jeff Steeger was not acting in his official capacity when
he planned the party. Trygve Moler, the President of Molerway, has
testified that "Jeff Steeger had absolutely no authority whatsoever
9

to act on behalf of Molerway in any manner in connection with this
activity." R.85. (Affidavit of Trygve Moler, f 7. Jeff Steeger has
testified likewise. R.90. (Affidavit of Jeff Steeger, f 17. In
order to avoid summary judgment, Plaintiffs had to present credible;
evidence that Jeff Steeger was authorized. This they have failed to
do. Instead, they merely state a factual conclusion that "Jeff
Steeger was clearly in charge." R.164. (Affidavit of Debra Zuver,
f 13). This is nothing more than a factual conclusion which cannot:
be used to civoid summary judgment. Winter v. Northwest Pipeline
Corp. , 820 P.2d 916, 919 (Utah 1991). Such a factual statement does
not provide any evidence that Jeff Steeger was authorized by
Molerway to be in charge as opposed to his being in charge due to
a strong personality.
V.A. The employees attending the party were not within the
scope of their employment because Molerway had no right to control
these individuals. Whitehead v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 80].
P.2d 934, 937 (Utah 1989). The Plaintiff Debra Zuver has testified
that she attended the party voluntarily and on her own free time,,
She also testified that she was not being paid by Moler ay for
attending the party. She testified that she brought alcohol

o the

party and did not expect to be reimbursed. There is no evi ance
that Molerway provided any provisions, food, or beverages to the
party. Under these circumstances, Molerway had no right to control
10

these individuals. Molerway submits that as a matter of law, an
employer cannot control the actions of its employees while they are
on their free time and are not being paid.
V.B. Applying the factors set forth by the Utah Supreme Court
also leads to the conclusion that these employees were outside the
scope of employment during the party. Birkner v. Salt Lake County,
771 P.2d 1053, 1056-57 (Utah 1989). The first factor is that the
conduct be of the general kind the employee is employed to perform.
Molerway is a commercial trucking company. It does not hire its
employees to hold parties or commit sexual assaults. Thus, the
weekend activities were not of the "general kind the employee is
employed to perform." The second factor is that the "employee's
conduct must occur within the hours of the employee's work and the
ordinary special boundaries of the employment." Birkner, 771 P.2d
at 1057. This party occurred some 106 miles from the Molerway
terminal and while the employees were enjoying their free time.
This party was clearly not within the time and space of the
employees' employment. The third factor is that "the employee's
conduct must be motivated, at least in part, by the purpose of
serving the employer's interests." Id. at 1057. This party did not
contribute to Molerway's commercial freight business. The party was
designed solely to serve the personal needs of those attending.
Molerway does not benefit by that which the employees do on their
11

own free time and when they are not being paid.
Plaintiffs argue that these individuals could, even though not
authorized

to

act,

bind

the

corporation

because

they

were

"improving working relationships through a social function." This
notion that an employee can transform his actions into corporate
actions simply by stating that they benefitted the employer is poor
public policy.
VI. Molerway believes that this appeal can be decided on th€:
basis of one simple fact: the party was a social gathering. Th€i
Utah Supreme Court has long held that:
Conversely, if the predominant motivation and purpose of
the activity is in serving the social aspect, or other
personal diversion of the employee, even though there may
be some transaction of business or performance of duty
merely incidental or adjunctive thereto, the person
should not be deemed to be in the course of his
employment.
Martinson v. W-M Ins. Agcy. , Inc., 606 P. 2d 256 (Utah 1980). Here,
the employees were on their free time and were engaged in a
personal party. Thus, applying Martinson, the employees were not
acting within the scope of their employment and Molerway cannot be
held liable for any of the actions of the employees.
VII. Molerway cannot be held liable under the Utah Dramshop
Act, Utah Code Ann. § 32A-14-101 (1991). This Court has held that
that Act "does not apply to individuals in a non-commercial social
setting." Sneddon v. Graham. 821 P.2d
12

1185

(Utah App. 1991) .

Plaintiffs1

argument

that

this party

was

commercial

because

Molerway allegedly planned and conducted the party is contrary to
this ruling and should be rejected.
VIII. Plaintiffs spend considerable time arguing that Milton
Zuver had standing to enforce the minor Plaintiff's intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim against Molerway and Jeff
Steeger. However, as demonstrated above, there is no evidence that
Jeff Steeger intended to injure the minor Plaintiff. Thus, there is
no liability to impute to Molerway. Whether or not Milton Zuver has
standing to enforce this claim is irrelevant because there is no
evidence which supports the claim. On the basis of the foregoing,
summary judgment was appropriately granted to Molerway.
ARGUMENT
OVERVIEW
The real issue here is whether or not an employer can be held
liable for the acts of its employees while they enjoy their free
time. More particularly, is an employer liable when two or more of
his employees interact socially on their free time? The following
example illustrates the issues.
Assume this Court decides to have a Christmas party. The Court
wants all the employees to attend and to bring their spouses. The
party will take place at one of the judge's homes after hours. No
one is paid to attend the party, and there is no requirement that
13

any employee attend. Each member of the Court brings some item for
the overall good of the party. No one is, or expects to be,
reimbursed for the cost of bringing those items. News of the party
is spread through the office because that is the most convenient
place to tell people about the party.
Under these circumstances, are the judges and their staff
within the scope of employment? Is the State of Utah liable for the
acts of the judges and their staff while on their free time?

At

base, the issues are when does an employer's liability for the
actions of his employees cease and should an employer be held
liable anytime two or more of his employees congregate socially?
In its motion for summary judgment, Molerway alleged that it.
could not be liable for the acts of the employees because they were:
not in the scope of their employment while attending the party.
Molerway also alleged that it could not be held liable for the
allegedly improper acts of Ted Prokupis and Jeff Steeger. Molerway
will first demonstrate that even if the party was within the scope
of the employees' employment, it cannot be held liable for the
alleged misconduct of Jeff Steeger and Ted Prokupis. Molerway will
then demonstrate for this Court that the employees were not within
the scope of their employment during the weekend party.

14

I.
MOLERWAY CANNOT BE HELD LIABLE UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF
RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR FOR THE ACTIONS OF DEFENDANT TED
PROKUPIS
The Plaintiffs brought claims against Ted Prokupis for assault
and battery and

intentional

infliction of emotional distress

stemming from an alleged sexual assault upon the Plaintiff,

The

Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendant Molerway liable for the action of
Defendant Ted Prokupis under the doctrine of respondeat superior•
However, Molerway cannot be held vicariously liable for the
sexual misconduct of the Defendant Ted Prokupis or any other
employee. In Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P. 2d 1053 (Utah
1989) , the Utah Supreme Court held that "as a matter of law the
sexual

misconduct

of

an

employee

is

outside

employment." Id. at 1058 (citations omitted).

the

scope

of

The Utah Supreme

Court explained its reasoning as follows:
Although Flowers' misconduct took place during, or in
connection with, therapy sessions, it was not the general
kind of activity a therapist is hired to perform. More
critical, it was not intended to further his employer's
interest. On the contrary, it served solely the private
and personal interest of Flowers. Neither Flowers nor
Birkner thought their sexual contact was part of therapy-the service that Flowers was hired to provide. Flowers1
conduct arose from his own personal impulses, and not
from an intention to further his employer's goals.
Id. at 1058. As in Birkner, any alleged sexual misconduct of the
Defendant Ted Prokupis would have "served solely the private and
personal interests of" Prokupis and just as sexual misconduct "was
15

not the general kind of activity a therapist is hired to perform",
sexual misconduct is not the general kind of activity that the
Defendant Ted Prokupis was hired to perform.
Thus, under the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Birkner, the
Defendant Molerway cannot be held liable for the acts of Defendant
Ted Prokupis under the doctrine of respondeat superior and summary
judgment was properly granted.
II.
DEFENDANT MOLERWAY CANNOT BE HELD LIABLE UNDER THE
DOCTRINE OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR FOR THE ACTIONS OF
DEFENDANT JEFF STEEGER.
Plaintiffs

also

alleged

that Jeff

Steeger

intentionally

inflicted emotional harm upon the Plaintiffs. Before the trial
court, Molerway argued that it could not be held liable because the
trial court granted summary judgment to Jeff Steeger on the grounds
that he did not witness the assault or, in the alternative, did not
intend the consequences of the assault. Therefore, because Jeff
Steeger was without fault, there was no liability to impute to
Molerway. The trial court properly granted summary judgment in
favor of Jeff Steeger and Molerway.
In order for an act to be intentional, the actor must

tend

the consequences of his actions or have in mind a substai ial
certainty that harm will result from an intentional act. Matheson
v. Pearson, 619 P.2d 321, 322 (Utah 1980). The Utah Supreme Court
16

has stated:
An individual may undertake an intentional act, such as
throwing the tootsie pop in this particular case, and if
the act is undertaken without an intent to harm or a
substantial certainty that harm will result from the act,
the actor is not guilty of an intentional tort. Instead,
in such a situation, the activity is properly classified
as reckless disregard of safety or reckless misconduct.
Such reckless misconduct results when a person, with no
intent to cause harm, intentionally performs an act so
unreasonable and dangerous that he knows or should know,
it is highly probable that harm will result. As explained
in comment (f) of Section 500, Restatement of Torts, 2d:
"Reckless misconduct differs from intentional
wrongdoing in a very important particular.
While an act to be reckless must be intended
by the actor, the actor does not intend to
cause the harm which results from it. It is
enough that he realizes or, from facts which
he knows, should realize that there is a
strong possibility that harm may result, even
though he hopes or even expects that his
conduct will prove harmless. However, a strong
probability is a different thing from the
substantial certainty without which he cannot
be said to intend the harm in which his act
results."
It is this absence of intent to harm which renders
reckless misconduct or reckless disregard of safety a
form of negligence and not an intentional tort.
Id. at 322-23. The intentional act of which Plaintiffs' complain is
Jeff Steeger's failure to act when he allegedly witness the assault
and the intentional consequence is the alleged emotional distress
suffered by Plaintiffs. However, there was no evidence that Jeff
Steeger intentionally failed to act nor did he know that harm would
result. Jeff Steeger testified as follows:
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7. When I noticed Debra at 3:00 p.m. she appeared to be
intoxicated; she was slurring her words, having trouble
walking and her eyes would wander. As the evening
approached, she became loud, antagonistic and appeared to
stagger when she walked. She continued to get worse
because she continued drinking on into the evening.
9. I noticed that it seemed that wherever Ted went Debra
followed. She seemed to follow him around all day.
12. After the incident with the stranger, I was at the
camp fire and saw Debra go up to Ted and sit on his lap.
She then started kissing him. She had been drinking a lot
all day and appeared intoxicated.
13. I then saw Debra take Ted by his hand and lead him to
her truck and saw them climb into the back.
14. A polaroid was taken of Ted and Debra as they were
laying in the back of her truck. I saw those pictures and
they showed them with their clothes on. The photos were
subsequently destroyed.
15. My wife and I checked on Ted and Debra approximately
six or seven times and saw nothing happening. They
appeared to be passed out.
17. I heard no screams or any other noises coming from
Debra1 s truck while Ted was in there. My wife and I were
sleeping in our own truck which was less than three feet
from Debra's truck.
R.264-265. (Affidavit of Jeff Steeger, f 13-18).
These facts demonstrate that from Jeff Steeger's perspective,
there was nothing going on between Plaintiff and Ted Prokupis other
than a consensual arrangement

initiated by Debra Zuver. This

testimony leads inextricably to the conclusion that Jeff Steeger
did not intend any harm to the Plaintiffs, nor did he have in mind
a "substantial certainty" that harm would result.
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In order to avoid summary judgment, Plaintiff had to present
some evidence demonstrating that Jeff Steeger did know that there
was a "substantial certainty" that the harm would result. This the
Plaintiffs failed to do. In their brief before this Court, the
Plaintiffs simply state that "the trier of fact could find,
especially in the latter stages of the sequence of events, that
Steeger

f

had

in

mind

a

belief

(or

knowledge)

that

given

consequences were substantially certain to result.1" (Brief of
Appellee, p. 21) . However, the Plaintiffs present no evidence
demonstrating that Jeff Steeger believed anything other than that
which he stated in his affidavit.
In essence, the Plaintiffs only defense to Jeff Steeger!s
motion for summary judgment was that a jury could find that Jeff
Steeger was not credible—that he really did not believe what he
stated in his affidavit. However, a party may not contend that the
other party's witnesses are not credible in order to avoid summary
judgment. Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court has held that "[t]he court
cannot consider the weight of testimony or the credibility of
witnesses in considering a motion for summary judgment." Sandberg
v. Klein, 576 P.2d 1291, 1292 (Utah 1978).
On the basis of the foregoing, the trial court properly
concluded that there was no evidence that Jeff Steeger intended the
harm which resulted. Because Jeff Steeger could not be held liable
19

for the allegations that he intentionally inflicted emotional hanr.
upon the Plaintiffs, there is no liability which can be vicariously
imputed to Molerway. Thus, the summary judgment

in favor of

Molerway was proper.
III.
DEFENDANT MOLERWAY CANNOT BE HELD LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENT
SUPERVISION BECAUSE JEFF STEEGER HAS BEEN ABSOLVED OF
LIABILITY
The crux of the Plaintiffs' negligent supervision claim is
that Jeff Steeger witnessed the alleged assault, yet failed tc
protect the Plaintiff or supervise Ted Prokupis in ending the
assault. R.6, (Complaint, f 26). According to the Plaintiffs, Jeff
Steeger's failures in this regard are to be imputed to Molerway.
However, the trial court ruled that: "There is absolutely no
evidence that Steeger even witnessed the assault." R.282. (Minute
Entry, page 1).

Thus, the entire basis for the Plaintiffs'

negligent supervision claim against Jeff Steeger and Molerway, that
Jeff Steeger witnessed "he assault but failed to prevent it, is
based on facts which the trial court ruled were without merit. On
the basis of the foregoing, the Plaintiffs1 allegations against
Molerway for negligent supervision must be dismissed. Moreover, as
set forth below, it is undisputed that Jeff Steeger and Ted
Prokupis were not acting in their official capacities at the time
of the assault.

Thus, Jeff Steeger had no duty to aid Plaintiffs
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against the alleged

assault.

Summary Judgment was properly

granted.
In conclusion, the Utah Supreme Court has already held that
the sexual misconduct of an employee cannot be imputed to an
employer. Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053, 1056-59 (Utah
1989). Moreover, the evidence in this case indicates that Jeff
Steeger did not act intentionally and therefore, there is no
liability to impute to Molerway.
Thus, even if the employees were acting within the scope of
their employment during the party, Molerway cannot be held liable
for any of the actions of Jeff Steeger or Ted Prokupis. Therefore,
summary judgment was properly granted for Molerway. The remainder
of this brief demonstrates that none of the employees were acting
within the scope of the their employment during the party.
IV.
MOLERWAY CANNOT BE HELD LIABLE FOR THE ACTIONS OF THOSE
ATTENDING THE PARTY BECAUSE JEFF STEEGER WAS NOT ACTING
IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY WHEN HE ORGANIZED THE PARTY.
Plaintiff alleges that the party was sponsored, promoted, and
conducted by Molerway. The only link between Molerway and the party
was the involvement of Jeff Steeger, the manager of the Salt Lake
terminal. Plaintiff alleges that Jeff Steeger planned the party and
therefore, Molerway must be deemed to have vicariously planned the
party.
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However, the Plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that
Jeff Steeger was acting in his official capacity when he planned
the party. The Plaintiffs have not even attempted to do so. On the
other hand, Molerway presented the testimony of Trygve Moler,
President of Molerway, who testified

that

"Jeff

Steeger had

absolutely no authority whatsoever to act on behalf of Molerway in
any manner in connection with this activity." R.85. (Affidavit of
Trygve Moler, 1 7) Jeff Steeger has also testified that he "had
absolutely no authority whatsoever to act on behalf of Molerway in
any manner in connection with this activity." R.90. (Affidavit of
Jeff Steeger,fl17).
In order to avoid summary judgment, the Plaintiffs were
required to present some evidence showing that Jeff Steeger was
acting in his official capacity. This they have failed to do.
Instead, Plaintiffs asked the trial court to assume that Jeff
Steeger was acting officially. Only then could they establish a
link between Molerway and the party. It is axiomatic that a party
may not rely upon assumptions to avoid summary judgment, but
instead must produce admissible evidence placing material issues
into dispute. Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857 (Utah 1983).
In an attempt to defeat summary judgment, Plaintiffs merely
assert that "Jeff Steeger was clearly in charge" (Affidavit of
Debra Zuver, 1 13) . This is nothing more than a factual conclusion
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and opinion. The Utah Supreme Court has held that " [a] negations of
a pleading or factual conclusions of an affidavit are insufficient
to raise a genuine issue of fact." Winter v. Northwest Pipeline
Corp.. 820 P.2d 916, 919 (Utah 1991). Even if such statements were
admissible, they do not suggest that Molerway placed Jeff Steeger
"in charge" as opposed to his being "in charge" because people like
Debra Zuver chose to follow his instructions due to his natural
leadership ability. Plaintiffs have simply failed to present any
evidence contradicting the statements of Jeff Steeger and Trygve
Moler that Mr. Steeger was not authorized to conduct this party.
Because there was no viable link between Molerway and the party,
summary judgment for Molerway was proper.

MOLERWAY CANNOT BE HELD LIABLE FOR THE ACTIONS OF TED
PROKUPI8 OR JEFF STEEGER BECAUSE THE EMPLOYEES WERE NOT
ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THEIR EMPLOYMENT DURING THE
PARTY.
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, employers are held
vicariously liable for the torts of their employees committed
within the scope of their employment. See, generally, Birkner v.
Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053, 1056-59 (Utah 1989). The issue
here is whether the employees attending the party were acting
within the scope of their employment at the time of the alleged
assault. Molerway respectfully submits that these individuals were
not acting within the scope of their employment during the party.
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A. MOLERWAY HAD NO RIGHT TO CONTROL THE ACTIONS OF THESE
INDIVIDUALS AND, THEREFORE, CANNOT BE HELD LIABLE FOR THE IE
ACTIONS.
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted the approach of the
Restatement (Second) of Agency, Section 228,11 for determining if
an individual is acting within the scope of his or her employment.
Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053, 1056-57 (Utah 1989).
Both the Restatement provision and the Birkner analysis inquire:
into whether the act was of the kind the employee was hired to
perform, whether the act occurs within the authorized time and
space limits of employment and whether the act is one to serve the*
employer's purpose. Id. at 1056-57.
The ultimate issue to be decided in applying these factors is;
whether the employee is under the control of the employer at the
time of the alleged tort. As the Supreme Court of Oregon hasi

11

Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 228 provides:

(1) Conduct of a servant is within the scope of
employment if, but only if:
(a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform;
(b) it occurs substantially within the authorize time and
space limits;
(c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to
serve the master;
(d) if force is intentionally used by the servant aga *s1:
another, the use of force is not unexpectable by Jie
master.
(2) Conduct of a servant is not within the scope of employment
if it is different in kind from that authorized, far beyond
the authorized time and space limits, or too little actuated
by the purpose to serve the master.
24

stated:
In reality, the question of whether the employer had a
"right to control" the employee is merely another way of
asking whether the activity in question occurred within
the authorized limits of time and space, so that it is
fair to make the employer vicariously liable for the
conduct of the employee.
Stanfield v. Loccarce. 588 P.2d 1271, 1275 (Or. 1978).
Obviously, it would be patently unfair to hold an employer
liable where it had no ability to control the actions of the
employee and thus, had no ability to prevent the tort. Thus, the
drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Agency explicitly noted:
As stated in Section 220, one is a servant only if, as to
his physical conduct in the performance of the service,
he is subject to the control or the right to control of
the master. Hence, there is no liability for the conduct
of one who, although a servant in performing other
service, is doing work as to which there is no control or
right to control by the master.
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 220 comment c. In this regard, the
following has also been stated:
Again, it is essential to the relation of employer and
employee—and the rule, of course, is the same where it
is contemplated that the employee shall act as the agent
or representative of the employer or principal—that the
employer shall have power and authority to direct and
control the acts of the alleged employee. Having had this
power, the employer or principal must respond in damages;
having lacked it, he may not be held accountable. While
the maxim respondeat superior is often said to be founded
upon the principle that one who expects to derive profit
or advantage done for him by another must answer for any
injury which a third person may sustain from the doing of
that act, the real test of liability is the power or
right to control the employee rather than the benefit
which may be derived from his services.
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53 Am.Jur.2d, Master and Servant, § 413, at p. 422 (1970).
The Utah Supreme Court made similar comments in holding that
an employee is not in the scope of employment when "going and.
coming" to the place of employment:
The major premise of the "going and coming" rule is that
it is unfair to impose unlimited liability on an employer
for conduct of its employees over which it has no control
and from which it derives no benefit. Therefore, the
major focuses in determining whether or not the general
rule should apply in a given case is on the benefit the
employer receives and control over the conduct.
Whitehead v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 801 P.2d 934, 937
(Utah 1989).
As demonstrated in the Statement of Facts, Molerway had no
right or ability to control the actions of those attending the:
party. The Plaintiff Debra Zuver has testified that her choice to
attend the party was voluntary. R.127. (Deposition of Debra Zuver,
p. 34) . Moreover, Debra Zuver testified that she attended the party
on her own free time and was not paid for attending the party.
R.127. (Deposition of Debra Zuver, p. 34). The party occurred some:
106 miles from the terminal where the employees worked. Debra Zuver
further testified that she brought alcoholic beverages to the party
and was not, and did not expect to be, reimbursed for the cost of
those items. R.128-129. (Deposition of Debra Zuver, pp. 28-29).
These facts are consistent with the testimony
employees who attended the party.
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of nine other

Under these circumstances, Molerway had no right to control
Debra Zuver or any of the other employees. It seems axiomatic that
the employer's right to control ceases when the employee is no
longer being paid or is in the employer's service. Thus, the
general rule is that one "going and coming" to work are not within
the scope of their employment. Whitehead v. Variable Annuity Life
Ins. Co., 801 P.2d 934, 937 (Utah 1989).

Here, the employees were

on the their free time and were not being paid. The employees paid
for all the provisions used at the party. If Molerway had some
ability to control what these employees did on their free time, it
is left to wonder what that means of control would be.
Debra Zuver counters these facts by simply stating that "I
felt subject to Mr. Steeger's instructions and directives." R.164.
(Affidavit

of Debra

Zuver, f

13) . The problem

with

such a

contention is that it does not state any facts which would suggest
that Molerway had a right to control Debra Zuver1s actions, or the
actions of anyone else attending the party. Indeed, it is hard to
imagine why Debra Zuver would feel "subject to" Jeff Steeger's
instructions when she was on her free time and was not being paid
by Molerway, and when she knew that the guests, and not Molerway,
were providing all of the food and beverages to the party. Indeed,
Molerway had no right to control whether or not Plaintiffs remained
at the party, so it is difficult to imagine how Molerway could have
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controlled her actions while she attended the party.
Because there is no rational basis to suggest that Molerway
had a right to control the actions of the employees, summary
judgment was properly granted.
B. MOLERWAY CANNOT BE HELD VICARIOUSLY LIABLE UNDER THE BIRKNER
CRITERIA.
The sarnie conclusion can be reached applying the factors set
forth in Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P. 2d 1053, 1056-57 (Utah
1989) . Under Birkner, the Plaintiff has the burden of proving the
following three elements:
First, an employee's conduct must be of the general kind
the employee is employed to perform • . . that means that
an employee's acts or conduct must be generally directed
towards the accomplishment of objectives within the scope
of the employee's duties and authority, or reasonably
incidental thereto. In other words, the employee must be
about the employer's business and the duties assigned by
the employer, as opposed to being wholly involved in a
personal endeavor.
* * *

Second, the employee's conduct must occur within the
hours of the employee's work and the ordinary spacial
boundaries of the employment.
* * *

Third, the employee's conduct must be motivated, at least
in part, by the purpose of serving the employer's
interest.
Birkner v. Salt Lake County. 771 P.2d 1053, 1056-57 (Utah 1989).
The first factor is the "employee's conduct must be of a
general

kind the employee

is employed

to perform." Clearly,

Molerway does not hire its employees to have parties on the
weekends awray from the place

of business. More
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importantly,

engaging in alleged sexual assaults is not the "general kind" of
activity which any of the employees were hired to perform. Thus,
the first factor leads to the conclusion that the employees were
not within the scope of their employment.
The second Birkner criteria is that "the employee's conduct
must occur within the hours of the employee's work and the ordinary
spacial boundaries of the employment." Birkner, 771 P.2d at 1057.
This party occurred over one hundred miles from the Molerway
terminal and occurred on a weekend and while the employees were
enjoying their free time. The party did not occur during the
employees' work hours or anywhere near the

location of the

terminal. This factor also supports a finding for Molerway.
The final factor is that "the employee's conduct must be
motivated, at least in part, by the purpose of serving the
employer's interest." Birkner, 771 P.2d at 1057. It is difficult to
imagine how the party contributed to Molerway's business. Molerway
has never hired an employee to conduct parties, nor has Molerway
hired individuals to engage in sexual assaults. Molerway hires
employees to carry cargo from point A to point B. The employees
were not engaged in any business purpose at the time of the alleged
assault or during the party.
Plaintiff

argues that

"[ijmproving

working

relationships

through a social function" is a business purpose for which Molerway
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should be held liable. Brief of Appellant, p. 35. This contention
may have merit if the employer authorized or participated in the
party. However, the evidence is undisputed here that Jeff Steeger
planned and conducted the party in his individual capacity and thai:
Molerway was not involved in the party.
The Plaintiffs claim that so long as the employer receives a
benefit, it can be held liable whether or not it authorized the
activity or whether it had any right to control the actions of the
employees. In essence, the Plaintiffs' argument means that the
employee has the right to "authorize himself" to do the act simply
by stating that he

is doing the act

for the employer. But

traditional principles of law indicate that power flows from the
master to the servant. Plaintiff cannot transform her actions and
those of her fellow employees into the actions of Molerway simply
by stating that her actions at the party improved her working
relationships which benefitted Molerway.
Moreover, this argument is troubling because it opens the door
to vast liability for employers. If two employees visit a tavern
after work and drink to excess, is the employer liable if the
employees injure someone while driving home? Is the employer liable
if the injured person merely alleges that the employees were
developing their "working relationship" at the tavern?

Molerway

submits that as a matter of public policy, it should only be held
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liable for activities which it can control. Molerway cannot, and
could not, control the employees at this party while they are on
their free time and not being paid.
The employees were not within the scope of their employment
whether the "right to control" or Birkner tests are applied. As
such, Molerway could not control the actions of these employees or
prevent the alleged tort. On the basis of the foregoing, Molerway
respectfully requests that the summary judgment be affirmed.
VI.
THE PARTY WAS A SOCIAL GATHERING AND, THEREFORE, THE
EMPLOYEE8 WERE NOT ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THEIR
EMPLOYMENT
Molerway believes that this appeal can be decided on the basis
of one simple fact: the party was a social gathering. As noted in
the Statement of Facts, both parties agree that the party was
primarily and predominantly social in nature. The Utah Supreme
Court has long held that:
Conversely, if the predominant motivation and purpose of
the activity is in serving the social aspect, or other
personal diversion of the employee, even though there may
be some transaction of business or performance of duty
merely incidental or adjunctive thereto, the person
should not be deemed to be in the course of his
employment.
Martinson v. W-M Ins. Aqcy. , Inc., 606 P. 2d 256 (Utah 1980). Under
Martinson, if the primary and predominant purpose is social in
nature, then the individuals are not acting within the scope of
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their employment as a matter of law.
their free time and were engaged

Here, the employees were on
in a personal party. Thus,

applying Martinson, the employees were not acting within the scope
of their employment and Molerway cannot be held liable for any of
the actions of the employees.
VII.
MOLERWAY CANNOT BE HELD LIABLE UNDER THE DRAMSHOP ACT
BECAUSE THE PARTY WAS A NONCOMMERCIAL SOCIAL SETTING
Plaintiff argues that Molerway can be held liable under the
Utah Dramshop Act, Utah Code Ann. § 32A-14-101 (1991), in that
Molerway provided alcohol to Ted Prokupis while he was intoxicated,,
Plaintiff still has the burden of showing that the beer brought by
Debra Zuver and Jeff Steeger can be said to be "brought" by
Molerway. This issue rests upon the discussion above relating to
authority and scope of employment.
However, even assuming the alcohol can be attributed to
Molerway, this Court has held that the L ah Dramshop Act "does not
apply to individuals in a noncommercial social setting." Sneddon v >
Graham, 821 P.2d 1185 (Utah App. 1991). Plaintiff argues Sneddon
can be distinguished because the social setting ther
household party whereas the social setting here was a pa:
reservoir.

Moreover,

Plaintiffs

claim

the

party

hei

was a
at a
was

"commercial" because Molerway is a business. Molerway respectfully
contends thcit the Legislature intended to impose liability upon
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pubs, taverns, and bars. It did not intend to impose liability on
everybody upon which clever plaintiffs can stick a "commercial"
label. Molerway is not in the business of distributing liquor, and
did not do so here. As such, Plaintiffs' argument should be
rejected and summary judgment should be affirmed.
VIII.
THE CLAIM8 OF THE MINOR PLAINTIFF, DOWNY ZUVER, AND
MILTON ZUVER WERE PROPERLY DISMISSED
The minor Plaintiff, Downy Zuver, and Milton Zuver, brought
actions alleging that Jeff Steeger and Molerway

intentionally

inflicted emotional distress upon the minor Plaintiff. In their
brief, the Plaintiffs spend considerable time arguing that Milton
Zuver had standing to sue on behalf the minor Plaintiff.
However, even assuming that this is true, the Plaintiffs have
still failed to present any evidence indicating that either Jeff
Steeger or Molerway intended any harm to Downy Zuver. Without such
evidence, the claim must be dismissed regardless of whether Milton
Zuver has standing to make these allegations. Because the trial
court properly ruled that Jeff Steeger did not intentionally injure
the Plaintiffs, summary judgment in favor of Molerway was proper.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, Molerway respectfully requests
that summary judgment in favor of Molerway be affirmed.
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